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NOTES
Thompson could not recover from the purchaser. The option holder,
as possessor of a real right, should have been subject to the same
protection as a purchaser. In any event, the subsequent enactment
of R.S. 9:2721 with the grant of protection to a third party from
"secret equities" and R.S. 9:2722 which defines the third party as any
person "acquiring any real or personal right" in immovable property
should be considered to have legislatively overruled Thompson,
thereby giving third party purchasers and option holders the same
protection ."
The correct solution to a problem involving an attack by a forced
heir on a simulated contract of his ancestor is to allow the revelation
of the true intent of the parties through Civil Code article 2239, and
then to determine which intent shall goven in view of the relationship
of the parties. When a third party has acquired a real right in the
property, the existence of the feigned or secret intent, whether in a
disguised donation or nontransfer simulation, should be considered
a secret equity and should not affect the third party.
Robert Barton Allen
THE LAKE DILEMMA
Six Mile Lake is one of the five largest bodies of water in Louis-
iana. Although certain of its geological traits are those of a running
stream, others are characteristic of a lake, and it is popularly consid-
ered a lake. Legal classification of this body of water as a stream
would give ownership of its bank to the riparian owners, while if it
were deemed a lake, the state would own up to the high-water mark.
In an action instituted by the state to determine ownership of the
bank of Six Mile Lake, the Louisiana supreme court, applying a
multi-factor test, held that Six Mile Lake is legally considered a lake.
State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974).
By virtue of the equal footing doctrine, lands submerged by na-
vigable waterways belong to the state as sovereign.' The state's inter-
37. Whether the third party is protected because the effect of article 2239 is
limited to suits against original transferor, as Redmann suggests, or because LA. R.S.
9:2721-22 (1950) protects him against the true intent of the simulated act, appears to
be merely two sides of the same coin. In a normal lawsuit brought by a forced heir,
one theory would limit the plaintiff, the other would protect the defendant. It seems
to be of little significance which one actually determines the outcome.
1. After the American Revolution and upon enactment of the U.S. Constitution,
the right to all navigable waters and the soils under them, extending to the present
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est extends to the ordinary high-water mark, with ownership of the
soil below that level being determined by local law.2 Louisiana law
distinguishes between rivers and streams on one hand and lakes on
the other in granting riparian landowners title to the soil between the
ordinary low and ordinary high-water marks.' While this area be-
longs to an owner whose land borders on a river or stream,4 the state
owns the bed of a lake to the ordinary high-water mark.' Another
important distinction is found in the application of the rules of the
Civil Code concerning alluvion, reliction, and dereliction.6 Unlike the
ordinary high-water mark, was reserved to the states. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,
414 U.S. 313 (1973); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926); Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46
(1874); Mumford v. Wardell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423 (1867); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 367 (1842). Upon admission to the union, new states entered on an equal
footing with the other states, thus enuring to their rights with respect to navigable
waterbottoms. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1 (1894); Mumford v. Wardell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423 (1867).
2. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 336, 72
So. 984, 986 (1916).
3. According to judicial constructions of article 457 of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870, this area is known as the "bank" of a waterbody. Article 455, however, men-
tions that the banks of only rivers and streams belong to the riparian owner. There is
no need to determine the bank of a lake, since other rules apply to such a waterbody.
In actuality, the word "bank" in the present article 457 is a mistranslation of the
French lit from article 457 of the French text of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. The
proper translation is "bed." Had the proper translation been made, the controversy
over this area would have been nugatory, following the French rule that the sovereign
owns the beds of all navigable waterbodies to the high-water mark. See 6 BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 136 (3d ed. Chauveau 1905);
6 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 16, 21 (1876). Nonetheless, the mistransla-
tion has become too entrenched in Louisiana law to be overturned by a judicial deci-
sion, and the judicial opinion based upon the present wording must be considered
controlling. See Seibert v. Conservation Comm., 181 La. 237, 159 So. 375 (1935);
Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922); State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329,
72 So. 984 (1916).
4. Seibert v. Conservation Comm., 181 La. 237, 159 So. 375 (1935); Wemple v.
Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922); State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984
(1916).
5. Doiron v. O'Bryan, 218 La. 1069, 51 So. 2d 628 (1951); Miami Corp. v. State,
186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936); State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304,
163 So. 145 (1935); State v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 164 La. 334, 113 So. 867 (1927);
State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635, 101 So. 4 (1924); Atchafalaya Land Co. v. James, 146
La. 109, 83 So. 426 (1919); State v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); Sapp v.
Frazier, 51 La. Ann. 1718, 26 So. 378 (1899); Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324 (1838);
Bedingfield v. Watson, 147 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
6. LA. CIv. CODE art. 509: "The accretions, which are formed successively and
imperceptibly to any soil situated on the shore of a river or other stream, are called
alluvion.
"The alluvion belongs to the owner of the soil situated on the edge of the water,
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owner of land bordering a navigable river or stream, the lakeside
landowner does not see his property increase as the water line shifts.7
The holdings of owners bordering on all navigable waterbodies, how-
ever, are reduced by encroaching water to the state's gain.' The clas-
sification of navigable waterbodies as rivers, streams, or lakes is
tl~erefore crucial, especially when mineral rights are at stake.
State v. Erwin9 presented the Louisiana supreme court with its
first opportunity to deal with the classification of waterbodies. Erwin
concerned the ownership of lands newly submerged under Calcasieu
Lake, and classification was necessary to determine the applicability
of the Code articles pertaining to alluvion and dereliction. Rejecting
an argument based upon French doctrine,"0 the court determined that
it must "regard such a vast expanse'of water as Calcasieu Lake as
being in fact a lake, although a river empties into the sea through
it."" Miami Corporation v. State" overruled Erwin on other
grounds, 13 but apparently employed the "vast expanse" test to clas-
whether it be a river or stream, and whether the same be navigable or not, who is bound
to leave public that portion of the bank which is required by law for the public use."
LA. Cry. CODE art. 510: "The same rule applies to derelictions formed by running
water retiring imperceptibly from one of its shores and encroaching on the other; the
owner of the land, adjoining the shore which is left dry, has a right to the dereliction,
nor can the owner of the opposite shore, claim the land which he has lost.
"This right does not take place in case of derelictions of the sea."
7. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936). There is, however,
considerable doubt as to the validity of this doctrine in light of the United States
Supreme Court decision of Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), in which
the Court held that the equal footing doctrine allowed Arizona to retain title to lands
submerged only to the present ordinary high-water mark of the Colorado River. While
it might be possible to distinguish Bonelli on the grounds that it concerned a river,
rather than a lake, the decision makes no distinction between navigable lakes on one
hand and rivers and streams on the other. See Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364
(1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876);
County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874); Mumford v. Wardell,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423 (1867); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
8. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
9. 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
10. Id. at 513, 138 So. at 86. The argument was made that French law would
classify such a waterbody as a river. The.court rightfully rejected this argument, since
a body of water traversed by a river is a lake under French doctrine. 4 FUZIER-HERMAN,
REPERTOIRE DU DROIT FRANCAIS 87 (1888). Even so, classification was not germane to
the issue if French doctrine were accepted, for it is settled French law that the sover-
eign owns the bottoms of both navigable rivers and lakes. Acceptance of this French
doctrine would have obviated the need to determine the classification, as all the lands
in question lay below the high-water mark. See generally note 40 infra.
11. State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 513, 138 So. 84, 86 (1931).
12. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
13. The Erwin holding that the state owned the bed of the lake only to the high-
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sify Grand Lake as a true lake.14
In a series of subsequent cases, however, the Louisiana supreme
court failed to apply directly the "vast expanse" test of Erwin. Both
Amerada Pertoleum Corp. v. State Mineral Board'5 and Amerada
Petroleum Corp. v. Case" concerned Arm of Grand Lake, an expan-
sive tributary of Grand Lake. 7 After a lengthy consideration of the
facts, the court in First A merada determined that Arm of Grand Lake
was a stream rather than a lake. 8 This holding was reinforced by the
decision in Second Amerada,9 -but in neither case did the court
clearly identify its criterion for determination. Similarly, the decision
in Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones"0 held that Deer Park Bend, a
channel once a part of the Mississippi River but cut off by dredging,
was a stream, but failed to define a clear test for classification.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in State v. Cockrell," how-
ever, seized upon certain language in First Amerada and Jones to
articulate definitions for river, stream, and lake. A river, the court
said, "flows, more or less in a permanent bed or channel between well
defined banks, with a current."22 Similarly, a stream was defined as
a body of water which, "though flowing, does not possess the well
defined walls and banks of a river .. ."23 A lake, on the other hand,
was characterized as "a body of water which is more or less stagnant
and in which the water is supplied from drainage."24 The court fur-
ther claimed that First Amerada and Jones had overruled the Erwin
test sub silentio, 5 and held that Six Mile Lake was a stream under
the newly pronounced definition.28
water mark as of 1812 was overruled. Instead, the court held that the state owned the
beds of navigable lakes to their ordinary high-water mark by virtue of its inherent
sovereignty. Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 820, 173 So. 315, 327 (1936).
14. See the Miami court's discussion of the facts surrounding Grand Lake at 186
La. 784, 795-97;'173 So. 315, 317-18. For further discussion see A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL
LAW PROPERTY § 31.5 (Supp.\ 1972).
15. 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d 61 (1943) [hereinafter referred to as First Amerada].
16. 210 La. 630, 27 So. 2d 431 (1946) [hereinafter referred to as Second Ameradal.
17. Arm of Grand Lake has twosignificant features that distinguish it from Calca-
sieu Lake and the other lakes concerned in waterbottom cases. It flows directly into a
larger body of water, rather than being the recipient from other sources, and is consid-
erably narrower than. the other waterbodies. While Arm of Grand Lake has a width
only of from 3960 feet to 4400 feet, Grand Lake, Six Mile Lake, and Calcasieu Lake
are all at least several miles wide.
18. 203 La. 473, 503, 14 So. 2d 61, 71 (1943).
119. 210 La. 630, 635, 27 So. 2d 431, 432 (1946).
20. 233 La. 915, 98 So. 2d 236 (1957).
21. 162 So. 2d 361 (La. App. lst Cir. 1964).
22. Id. at 367.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 366.
26. Id. at 373. This case marked the first time in Louisiana legal history that a
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The land involved in the instant case had been built up by an
alluvial process, and lay between the ordinary high-water mark and
the ordinary low-water mark, thus necessitating the classification of
Six Mile Lake once again. The contested land was part of the "bank"
under Louisiana law;v hence, there was no need to consider the ques-
tion of alluvion.2 8 If Six Mile Lake were declared a river or stream,
the area in question would belong to the riparian land-owner as bank;
if it were declared a lake, it would belong to the state up to the
ordinary high-water mark.
The question being one entirely of state law," the supreme court
undertook to review the decisions of Erwin, Miami, First Amerada
and Jones in order to classify Six Mile Lake.30 Careful examination
of the decisions in First Amerada and Jones led the court to reject
the Cockrell view that the Erwin-Miami "vast expanse" test for lake
court pronounced definitions for "river" and "stream." In deciding upon these criteria,
the court apparently ignored the French text from which the articles concerning navig-
able waters were translated. The French words for "river" and "stream" are, respec-
tively, fleuve and rivi&re. Under traditional French doctrine, the word rivibre refers to
bodies of water similar to but smaller than rivers (fleuves). See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari or Review for Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d
154 (La. 1974) (Nos. 53,294 and 53,295). This interpretation of the language is also in
accord with common societal notions regarding rivers and streams. Under such an
interpretation, it is obvious that Grand Lake-Six Mile Lake could conceivably be
termed a river (fleuve), but could not be declared a stream (rivibre).
27. See note 3 supra.
28. Although certain land in question was formed by an alluvial process, it could
not be considered alluvion of the nature envisioned by article 509 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870. Under this article, ownership of lands formed by an alluvial process
attaches to the riparian landowner only when the land is considered above the water
level with some degree of permanence. Maginnis Land & Imp. Co. v. Marcello, 168 La.
997, 123 So. 653 (1929); State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916); Delachaise
v. Maginnis, 44 La. Ann. 1043, 11 So. 715 (1892); Henderson v. Mayor of New Orleans,
5 La. 416 (1833); Morgan v. Livingston, 6 Mart. (O.S.) 19 (La. 1819). Since this land
lay below the ordinary high-water mark, it was necessary only to determine bank
ownership without regard to possible alluvial issues. This fact was also the basis for
the court's finding that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bonelli Cattle
Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973) (ownership of alluvian above the high-water mark
of the Colorado River is governed by federal common law), did not apply to the instant
case. In Placid the court said, "As we view it, the Bonelli decision is inapplicable to
the present case. The area in dispute there, once privately owned, was no longer part
of the river bed. The Court found it to have a location above the present high-water
mark. The instant case involves a bank area and alluvion below the ordinary high-
water mark of the lake. Unlike the land in Bonelli, the title"to the disputed area here
is vested in the State 'as a matter of settled federal law.' " State v. Placid Oil Co.,
300 So. 2d 176-77 (La. 1974).
29. See note 2 supra.
30. State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154, 173 (La. 1974).
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classification had been overruled." This conclusion was based upon
the fact that Erwin was expressly distinguished in First Amerada,32
and that the Jones decision involved facts so different from those in
Erwin as to present no conflict.33 Furthermore, support was drawn
from Doiron v. O'Bryan,"4 a 1951 case involving Calcasieu Lake,35 in
which the court implicitly accepted the Erwin test, applying "lake
rules" without detailed discussion of the issue.
Despite the finding that the Erwin test had not been overruled,
the court did not apply the test there enunciated, but rather articu-
lated a new, multi-factor test to determine waterbody character:
A judgment must be based upon a consideration of pertinent
characteristics. Among these are the size, especially its width as
compared to the streams that enter it; its depth; its banks; its
channel; its current, especially as compared to that of the
streams that enter it; and its historical designation in official
documents, especially on official maps. 6
In justifying the new test, the court said:
It is true that sectors of the Court's language in several of the
above cases focus strongly upon the existence of accretion-
forming current in the water body. When these decisions are read
as a whole, however, it is evident that the Court considered, not
one, but several characteristics of the water body in making its
classification. Our synthesis of these cases yields a conclusion
that the existence of accretion-forming current is not, by itself,
decisive of a stream classification.3 7
Turning to the characteristics of Six Mile Lake, the court noted
that it was one of the five largest waterbodies in Louisiana, that it
had been known popularly and categorized on official maps as a lake
since at least 1812, and that it was 30 miles long by 3 to 10 miles wide,
with a middle, or thalweg, depth of only 8 feet. Further, it found that
Grand Lake-Six Mile Lake is about 20 times wider than the Atchaf-
alaya River which enters it, that currents are substantially reduced
in the lake, and that 75 percent of the sedimentation is deposited in
31. Id. at 175: "We conclude, contrary to our first impression, that the holding of
State v. Erwin as to the classification of lakes has not been overruled."
32. Id. at 174.
33. Id. at 175.
34. 218 La. 1069, 51 So. 2d 628 (1951).
35. Calcasieu Lake, it will be remembered, is the same body of water involved in
State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84 (1931).
36. State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154, 175 (La. 1974).
37. Id.
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the lake, while only 25 percent is carried out."8 On the basis of these
findings, the court applied the multi-factor test to hold that Grand
Lake-Six Mile Lake was a lake in 1812 and at present. 9
In stepping away from the contrived legal criteria developed in
the Cockrell case, State v. Placid Oil Co. moves toward a more realis-
tic approach to the problem of waterbody classification. The multi-
factor test is more reasonable than the standard used in prior deci-
sions in that it allows determination based upon a balancing of facts
at hand rather than on a stringent judicial standard. The major prob-
lem inherent in the use of this test is the inability to predict with
certainty, prior to judicial consideration, the classification of a partic-
ular body of water. However, the accretion-carrying standard of
Cockrell does not furnish a test appreciably more certain for predict-
ing classification, since there is no concrete standard to determine
when a current crosses the judicial line between perceptibility and
imperceptibility. In addition, the new standard is consistent, at least
on the facts of Placid Oil, with French doctrine. 0
In practical terms, the decision allows the state to retain control
of an important area of the Atchafalaya Basin, an expanse critical for
conservation and flood control purposes as well as for its mineral
revenues. In promoting these ends, and in providing a workable stan-
dard of classification, State v. Placid Oil Co., if not a panacea for
predicting future judicial characterization of all waterbodies, is a
sound decision from both the legal and practical standpoints.
M. Thomas Arceneaux
SUCCESSION OF HYDE: NEW ALTERNATIVES IN ESTATE PLANNING
Testator bequeathed the usufruct of his entire estate to his sec-
ond wife leaving the naked ownership to his forced heirs, issue of his
38. Id.
39. Id. As Louisiana entered the Union in 1812, this is the date that is determina-
tive of status under the traditional notions of the equal footing doctrine. Under Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), the present status is also significant. See
generally notes 1, 7 supra.
40. Post Argument Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 6-7, State v. Placid Oil
Co., 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974): "[flf the body of water in question were not classified
as an etang salee [arm of the sea or coastal lake], it would be classified in France as
a lake. A body of water traversed by a river is a lake governed by the rule of Article
558 of the French Civil Code. 4 Fuzier-Herman, Repertoire due droit Francais 87
(1888)." This is true despite some language to the contrary in State v. Erwin, 173 La.
507, 138 So. 84 (1931), in which an argument was made based on French law. See
generally note 10 supra.
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